Russia Creates a New Security System to Replace the C.I.S.

Russia Creates a New Security System to Replace the C.I.S.
Drafted By: Marcin Kaczmarski
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The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. at the end of 1991 meant a break-up of the uniform defense space including its components such as nuclear forces, air defense systems, and the military-industrial complex. The Russian Federation, struggling to hold its position as a great power, tried to keep its dominance in the post-Soviet space using various methods, among which the military-political ones were the most important.

The process of loosening the geopolitical frontiers of the post-Soviet space, combined with the inefficiency of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.), forced Russia to put stress on sub-regional organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (C.S.T.O.), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (S.C.O.) or the Common Economic Space (C.E.S.).

Russia seemed not to take into account the changes that were occurring in the C.I.S. space in the recent years. It was only after the colored revolutions (in Georgia in 2003, and in Ukraine in 2004) that made the Kremlin notice the need to reshape thoroughly the regional security system in the post-Soviet space. The pro-Western direction of the foreign policies of the above mentioned states made military cooperation among the 12 C.I.S. members hardly possible. For instance, Georgia and Moldova concentrate on the Russian abandonment of military bases, and Turkmenistan, which declared neutrality, does not take part in the cooperation at all.

Political-Military Cooperation in the C.I.S.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia managed -- with the help of the United States -- to establish control of the nuclear forces that remained in the territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Russia's next move was to create a regional security structure within the C.I.S.

In May 1992, a Treaty on Collective Security was signed (also known as the Tashkent Treaty). Those agreeing to the treaty were Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The only countries which renounced the treaty were Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. The Tashkent Treaty was a mix of typical military alliances (its casus belli was aggression on one of the members) and collective security systems (the treaty authorized the parties to solve conflicts in the post-Soviet states).

The C.I.S. turned out to be beneficial for a "civilized divorce," but it did not fit for creating a new pro-Russian political-military bloc which would have become a tool of the reintegration of the post-Soviet space and would have opposed N.A.T.O. and E.U. expansion. Cooperation in the C.I.S. was influenced most negatively by a single factor: the aspirations of particular states for gaining full independence from Moscow. The core of this rebellious group was made of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova, which aimed at integration into the Western security and political structures, and Uzbekistan, which desired a leadership role in Central Asia (these states created an organization to cooperate its efforts, called G.U.U.A.M., which was supported by the U.S. State Department). Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan refused to continue the Tashkent Treaty in 1999.

Military cooperation in the C.I.S. framework was complex. A majority of the agreements concluded in the C.I.S. were either not ratified, or did not enter into force. Some of the C.I.S. states began to adjust their military structures to N.A.T.O. standards, and they began to see cooperation within the C.I.S. as counterproductive.

The N.A.T.O. Partnership for Peace (PfP) program gained a new dynamic after the last enlargement in 2004, and focused on the post-Soviet space, especially the South Caucasus states. Although at the moment N.A.T.O. does not foresee the membership of Georgia or Azerbaijan, its engagement in the region has increased in the form of common exercises. Russia perceives these activities as preparations for N.A.T.O.'s enlargement.

The country most engaged in cooperation with N.A.T.O. is Ukraine. It was the first C.I.S. country to sign the PfP program, and in 1997 the N.A.T.O.-Ukraine Commission was established. In 2002, Ukraine adopted an Action Plan, which was to serve as an answer to the reformulation of Ukraine's security strategy, which assumed the future membership of this country in the Alliance. It specified Ukraine's objectives in such areas as political and security issues, defense sector reforms, and included particular objectives in the sphere of cooperation with N.A.T.O. As a result of the Action Plan, defense reforms in Ukraine accelerated.

In April 2005, the new formula of the Intensified Dialogue between N.A.T.O. and Ukraine were established. This form of Intensified Dialogue for the first time was used in 1997 toward Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary after they had been invited to join N.A.T.O. That is why it is perceived as a milestone on Ukraine's road to the Alliance. It addresses issues related to Ukraine's possible membership.

Moscow's initial reaction to Ukraine's membership into N.A.T.O. was cautious. Russia learned from the previous enlargements that its opposition can be ignored, resulting in a loss of influence in the country in question. On the other hand, Russia treats N.A.T.O.'s enlargement to Ukraine less harmful for the prospects of its foreign policy in the post-Soviet space than it does an eventual E.U. enlargement. Additionally, Ukraine is dependent on Russian energy and is historically tied to Russia, making it difficult for Kiev to distance itself too far from Moscow.

The only successful enterprise of the C.I.S. was the common system of air defense. It began to operate in 1995, grouping ten C.I.S. states, but its line-up changed very quickly. In 1997, Georgia and Turkmenistan withdrew from it. Russia was forced to cooperate on a bilateral basis with Uzbekistan and Ukraine. The future of the air defense system is a source of worry for Russia.

Russia's military presence in the C.I.S. states includes 14,000 soldiers in such states as Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Russia justifies its presence by the need to stabilize the post-conflict zones (as in the case of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia), or by agreements concluded with its allies (as in the case of Belarus). In the case of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the future of Russian military bases is uncertain because of demands to withdraw them.

The C.S.T.O. as a New Defense Framework

The creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (C.S.T.O.) in October 2002 was the first Russian initiative on the road to a change of a security system in the post-Soviet space. Its members became the states that in 1999 continued the Tashkent Treaty; those states were Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. This new organization encompasses the most faithful Russian allies. Its aim is to fulfill one of the key goals of the transformation of Russian military forces, which assumes the consolidation of Russian influence in the territory of the former U.S.S.R. The stress is put on accommodating Russia's army forces to take part in modern wars. The priority is given to an ability to fight terrorism and regain global power-projection capabilities.

In 2005, Moscow intensified its activities, aimed at moving military cooperation from the C.I.S. forum to the C.S.T.O. Russia began the promotion of the C.S.T.O. on the international arena: it was granted observer status in the General Assembly of the U.N., it was recognized by the O.S.C.E. and the S.C.O. Moreover, efforts were made to begin cooperation with N.A.T.O., especially in Afghanistan.

The meeting of the main organ of the C.S.T.O. -- the C.S.T.O. Collective Security Council -- was organized in Moscow June 22-24, 2005. The decisions, which were adopted at the meeting, point out at the will to create a military component to the organization. In particular, the members discussed a plan for the development of integrated air defense systems and the improvement of rapid deployment forces in the Central Asian region. Additionally, the commission for military-economic cooperation was created; its aim is to create closer cooperation between military industries.

The meeting of the C.I.S. defense ministers council, which took place on June 24, 2005, confirmed only the shift of the military cooperation to the C.S.T.O. Georgia, Moldova, and Turkmenistan were absent, and Ukraine declared lowering its level of participation to observer status. In August 2005, the C.I.S. finally ceased to be a forum for military cooperation. According to the words of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the priorities of the C.S.T.O. include: cooperation in air defense, manufacturing of weapons, preparation of military personnel, and peacekeeping activities.

C.S.T.O. Activities

The C.S.T.O. practically took over the common defense system. It is made of 20 command control units, and 80 combat units, including rocket regiments, fighter aviation, and radio electronic units. The first phase of air defense system exercises began on June 25, 2005 and continued until September in Russia. They were formally defined as C.I.S. exercises, but only the parties of the C.S.T.O. took part in it. It marked the next step of Russia's plan to replace the air defense system of the C.I.S. with the integrated system of the C.S.T.O.

The situation in Afghanistan remains the most important regional security issue. The latest developments in this country are perceived by Russia, and the rest of the C.S.T.O. states, as a menace for the southern frontier. Afghanistan has not ceased to be a source of Islamic fundamentalism, which plays an always greater role in the Central Asian states. Additionally, the country remains the main producer of narcotics in the region, the eradication of which has become one of the main priorities of the C.S.T.O. [See: "Insurgents, Warlords and Opium Roil Afghanistan"]

Another important field of cooperation is the fight against terrorism. There is no doubt that this fight is being used as an excuse for repression against domestic political adversaries. Nonetheless, counter-terrorism is one of the highest priorities for the C.S.T.O. states.

Another goal of the C.S.T.O. for Russia is strengthening its military presence in allied states. Two military groupings function within the confines of the C.S.T.O. -- Russian-Belarusian (about 200,000 troops) and Caucasian (practically Russian-Armenian). Moscow perceives it as a means of support of the leaders in their countries, and as a way to preserve its influence. It is very important for Moscow to increase its military engagement in Central Asia. Since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Russia focuses on maintaining the status quo in the post-Soviet space, which is endangered by the inclusion of such powers such as the United States and China.

Conclusion

Russian policy toward the post-Soviet space has now become much more realistic than it was a few years ago. Russia wants to build a strong organization, not endangered by desertions of states wanting to join N.A.T.O. However, its potential allies still remain weak states, which forces Russia to finance the modernization of their military forces. Even this group of core members may create trouble for Moscow.

For instance, Kazakhstan has increased its activities in the Caspian Sea, despite Russia's protests. The military forces of Armenia and Kazakhstan take part in the stabilization of Iraq. Kyrgyzstan enabled American flights to Afghanistan over its territory, and allowed the U.S. to setup an airbase at Kant. Parts of the C.S.T.O. do not fully cooperate with Russia. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which cover 30 percent of the air space of the C.S.T.O., did not participate in an active phase of air defense exercises in September 2005.

Russian military expenditure reflects also a shift in its priorities in the C.I.S. In the year 2003, the part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's budget called "collective security and peacekeeping operations" was 1.4 billion rubles, and in 2004 it decreased sharply to 63 million rubles, and in 2005 to 61 million rubles. At the same time, the expenditure on Russian bases in C.S.T.O. members has increased.

Russia is trying to find an answer to what it perceives as an intervention by outside Western forces in its sphere of influence. The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. Ukraine, however, is still a battlefield between Russia and the West. Although the U.S.-E.U. combine enjoyed an important victory with Viktor Yushchenko's presidential win in December 2004, Russia's influence is far from suppressed, and the pro-Western camp appears internally divided after Yulia Timoshenko left Yushchenko's government. Nevertheless, this bloc has an interest in preventing Russian dominance.

The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia's side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising. [See: "Uzbekistan's New Foreign Policy Strategy"]

Report Drafted By:
Marcin Kaczmarski