A Prison Scandal Without an Answer

William M. Arkin on National and Homeland Security
A Prison Scandal Without an Answer

http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/01/a_prison_scanda.html

Col. Thomas M. Pappas, once commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, and the senior intelligence officer responsible for military interrogations at the Abu Ghraib prison, has now been given immunity from prosecution and has been ordered to testify at upcoming courts-martial of yet more low-ranking Army enlisted soldiers implicated in the mistreatment of detainees.

Pappas may seen like the military Scooter Libby falling on his sword to protect higher ranking officers, but the truth of the matter is that there will never be a connection made between the goings on at Abu Ghraib and the top ranks of either the Pentagon or the Bush administration.

The Washington Post reported on the front page this morning that developments in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal might finally answer the question of who ordered "the use of military working dogs to frighten detainees."

The news is that Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, the one time commander of the Guantanamo Bay prison and the supposed inspiration for Abu Ghraib's operations has invoked his right not to incriminate himself.

Col. Thomas M. Pappas also accepted immunity from prosecution. In May, Pappas was relieved of his European command stemming from dereliction of duty accusations over Abu Ghraib. Pappas was found to have failed to ensure that subordinates received adequately information, training and supervision in the applying interrogation procedures. According to the Pentagon, "he also allegedly failed to obtain the approval of superior commanders before authorizing a nonsanctioned interrogation technique, specifically the presence of military working dogs during the questioning of a detainee."

Pappas' nonjudicial proceedings resulted in a written reprimand and forfeiture of $4,000 pay per month for two months.

Seven enlisted military policemen have so far been prosecuted for treatment of detainees. Private Charles A. Graner received a 10-year prison sentence.

The military calls it different spanks for different ranks.

Pappas could surprise us all and implicate higher-ups in the chain of command. I find that unlikely.

Pappas has admitted that he improperly ordered the use of dogs. But he hasn't said much more, and he has never said a word indicating what was conveyed in face to face meetings with Miller or others, in video teleconferences, in phone calls, or in back channel communications.

Here's how it works: An Army Colonel in Iraq talks to his direct commander and liaises with adjacent commanders. He occasionally talks to the one-star staff officers, special assistants and executive aides to the two and three stars. The staff jockeys are themselves strap hangers and note takers in video teleconferences with the muckety-mucks in Europe and stateside where people with even more stars discuss issues of policy.

But not the most sensitive policies. When sensitive matters -- including issues of personality and high level assignments -- are being discussed, the general officers "meet" privately on the VTC without back seaters in the room. Or they talk on the phone.

In an era where even official Emails can be retrieved by investigators, "personal for" back channel communications going over separate "SCI" channels convey thoughts and orders for which there is no record.

Pappas has told investigators that he made cells available for CIA detainees as well as for Special Forces; that their detainees did not go through the regular processing procedures. It is just another "back channel," another suggestion of more to know. But it is also outside of Pappas' domain and a Top Secret sequel that only suggests commands from on high to operate in certain ways.

I wrote almost two years ago, when the Abu Ghraib scandal was first breaking ("The Making of a Mob: Muddled, leaderless, high-pressure conditions set the stage for abuse in Iraq" in The Los Angeles Times), that I didn't believe that an "order" would ever be uncovered, that a direct connection would ever be made between the soldiers in those cell blocks and officers at a higher level.

Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, one of the few heroes in this escapade and the initial investigating officer in the scandal, testified before Congress that a "failure in leadership, lack of discipline; no training whatsoever; and no supervision" led to the mistreatment.

I wrote then that "In the context of what was going on in Iraq [in 2003], a muddled, leaderless, unsupervised, high-pressure environment at Abu Ghraib led military policemen and their intelligence brethren to turn into a mob."

Heads should certainly roll, I said, but more important, I thought we should learn the lesson: "that we, represented by the American fighting men and women stuck in the muddled and hopeless endeavor of Iraq, are in way over our heads."

We still haven't learned that lesson.

The real crime of the wars since 9/11 is that when it comes to any kind of "sensitive" -- read controversial -- actions and policies, there are no explicit written orders. Without rules, without oversight, without accountability, with such a high octane and high pressured overblown -- almost manic -- enterprise, it is no wonder that many of the participants think that they are saving the world and thereby take liberties in their day-to-day efforts.

By William M. Arkin | January 12, 2006; 10:15 AM ET | Category: War on Terrorism
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